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Since A.G. Hopkins called on Africanists in 1976 to return to the study of 
imperial business, both as an extension of European and American business history and 
as an important facet of European colonial rule,2 a number of studies have been published 
that address aspects of imperial business history.3 An area that has remained largely 
unexplored by Africanists, however, is the history of oil exploration in colonial Africa, 
notwithstanding the extensive oil exploration activities during this period.4 This is not 
only true of the history of colonies with no known oil deposits such as Nyasaland, where 
British Petroleum, for example, spent £33,334 on a futile search for oil between 1918 and 
1928;5 the history of oil exploration in many of the African oil producing and exporting 
states seems to be remarkably brief.6  
 
Nigeria is no exception and the published oil historiography includes no article or 
book devoted exclusively to the topic. Only two authors, Carland and Njeze, have 
addressed oil exploration in colonial Nigeria in any depth, with Carland limiting his focus 
to the relationship between the Nigeria Bitumen Corporation and the Colonial Office 
between 1906 and 1914.7 Njeze, on the other hand, concentrated upon the case of Captain 
Edward Algernon Barnett in 1907 and the development of oil legislation in 1907, 1914 
and 1916 and dealt with other oil exploration activities between 1906 and 1958 rather 
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briefly.8 Consequently their accounts of oil exploration in colonial Nigeria are incomplete 
and leave out more than they include. Apart from these two authors, no standard 
monograph on the Nigerian oil industry has attempted a detailed examination of the 
exploration for oil there before the 1950s.9 
 
This article aims to make a contribution to Nigerian oil historiography by 
focusing exclusively on the exploration for oil in the colonial era between c.1903 and 
1958 when the first shipment of Nigerian crude oil arrived in Rotterdam. It integrates for 
the first time information in the archival collections found in the British National 
Archives, the Nigerian National Archives, the British Petroleum Archives, the Shell 
Group Archives, and the private family archives of the oil pioneer, Frank Drader, 
supplemented by published contemporary sources, in particular The Times and the West 
African Pilot. 
 
 The article suggests that, despite the anxiety over Britain’s reliance on foreign oil 
for most of the period, the British government did very little to encourage the exploration 
of the oil possibilities of Nigeria. Consequently the initiative to start exploratory work in 
the colony resided exclusively with private British oil ventures that set out to discover the 
proverbial Spindletop in Nigeria between 1903 and 1914. Small oil companies simply 
lacked the financial and technological resources to successfully explore for oil in the 
challenging Nigerian environment, and in the future only the major oil companies would 
be able to afford the huge financial and technological outlays that were required. Even 
then, it would take the Shell/D’Arcy joint venture fifteen years and millions of pounds 
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before discovering commercially exploitable oil resources in Nigeria in 1956. This 
dominance by the major oil companies would remain a characteristic of the Nigerian oil 
industry until the 1990s. Colonial oil exploration further established two additional trends 
that would characterise the Nigerian oil industry in the independent era: firstly, that oil 
was a national priority for the country regardless of its local impacts. Secondly, that the 
oil industry, from the outset, formed an enclave in the broader Nigerian economy with 
limited interaction beyond the utilisation of local labour between the general Nigerian 
economy and the emerging oil industry. 
 
Bitumen and oil exploration in the early years, c.1903-1914 
 
The onset of colonial rule in Africa coincided with the expansion of oil 
exploration to many areas of the globe.  Although supply far outstripped demand for 
crude oil at that stage, technological innovations such as the development of the internal-
combustion engine in the 1890s opened-up new uses for crude oil beyond its initial use 
mainly as an illuminating fuel and lubricant. These developments became crucial when 
the market for kerosene drastically declined after the introduction of natural gas as the 
main fuel for illumination. By 1914 kerosene constituted only 24.9 per cent of all refined 
crude oil products, while petroleum and fuel oil made up 63.7 per cent. The latter figure 
greatly increased in the decades that followed as motor cars, oil-burning steam 
locomotives, oil-fired industries and oil-based naval and merchant vessels became more 
popular.10 
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The advent of the global oil industry placed Britain in a rather precarious position: 
it only had a small indigenous shale oil industry based in Scotland which could not meet 
the demands for refined oil products in the country. Consequently British needs had to be 
met by foreign oil supplies which had to be transported over long distances at sea. The 
dependence on foreign oil supplies was especially problematic for the Admiralty who 
toyed with the idea of switching the Royal Navy vessels from coal to oil-burning for 
many years prior to 1912 when Winston Churchill, in his capacity as First Lord of the 
Admiralty, committed the Royal Navy permanently to oil. The Admiralty’s interest in 
fuel oil in the first decade of the twentieth century had two important repercussions: 
firstly, it meant that they took the lead in the development of an oil policy for Britain, 
which process began in 1904 when the decision was taken to limit oil concessions in 
British colonies to British-controlled companies. Secondly, it created interest in the oil 
possibilities of the vast unexplored regions of the British Empire. Though this empire 
stretched to all corners of the world at the turn of the century, oil was only produced in 
Burma and Canada by 1900, comprising a mere 1.2 per cent of global production. This 
increased marginally to 3.8 per cent by 1914 with oil being produced in India (including 
Burma), Trinidad, Canada, Egypt and Brunei.11 The search for a secure supply of oil 
within the British Empire resulted in the investigation of the oil possibilities of many 
African colonies, especially along the West Coast where it was known that the Atlantic 
Ocean often washed pieces of bitumen onshore and where oil seepages occurred over a 
wide area.12 
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While Standard Oil and the Shell Transport and Trading Company played 
important roles in expanding the oil industry in Europe and the Far East, global 
exploration in the period leading up to the First World War was largely driven by smaller 
oil companies, in particular from the United States and Britain, with varying degrees of 
success. The promise of vast returns on investments captured the imagination of British 
investors and attracted substantial British investment abroad which amounted to over 
£14.3 million by 1907, increasing to over £40 million by 1913. Jones points out that no 
less than 592 companies were registered in Britain by 1912 which were involved in either 
downstream or upstream oil-related activities. Many of these companies were small, 
speculative ventures which set out to discover the next Spindletop in Eastern Europe and 
the colonial world, with dismal results.13 The first companies to explore for oil in colonial 
Nigeria emerged from this section of the British oil industry, which controlled the first 
phase of oil exploration in the colony lasting from c.1903 to about 1914. 
 
The search for oil in Nigeria officially started in 1903 when two companies, 
Nigeria Properties (Limited) and the Nigeria and West African Development Syndicate 
(Limited) commenced exploration for bitumen, coal and oil.14 Their two concessions 
covered a territory of 400 m2 in the Agbabu-Mulekangbo area in the Lekki Lagoon region 
of Southern Nigeria. Geological investigations by Bernard A. Collins (1903-4, and 1904-
5) and A.H. Harrison (1904-5) confirmed the existence of vast bitumen deposits as well 
as the possibility of petroleum. They reported on their findings noting that 
Notwithstanding the shallow depth at which the deposits occur and the tropical heat of the territory, 
the bituminous deposits so far located are in a plastic condition; this seems to show that there is still 
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a flow of liquid from the original source, and gives the expectation that oil exists in considerable 
quantity.15 
 
The activities of Nigeria Properties, the Nigeria and West African Development 
Syndicate and a third concession holder, the Northern Nigeria Exploration Syndicate 
were very limited. This changed after 1905 when the British businessman John Simon 
Bergheim became interested in the oil possibilities of the colony. Bergheim had extensive 
experience in the European oil industry, in particular in Galicia and Romania, and was 
also the co-founder and co-owner of the Galizische Karpathen-Petroleum-
Actiengesellschaft.16 He became interested in Nigeria in 1905, at a time when the vast 
majority of British oil investments were made in Eastern Europe and the Americas, and 
established the first oil company that would undertake a serious exploration for bitumen 
and crude oil in Southern Nigeria. The Nigeria Bitumen Corporation was founded in 
November 1905 with the aim to acquire and work the exploration concessions of Nigeria 
Properties and the Nigeria and West African Development Syndicate. The concessionary 
area was expanded in November 1906 when the company bought the concession of the 
Northern Nigeria Syndicate which was situated adjacent to that of Nigeria Bitumen in the 
Lekki Lagoon area. Contrary to the view promoted by Njeze, Frynas and many other 
authors, Nigeria Bitumen was not a German company; it was a British-registered 
company and its shares were traded on the West African Market of the stock exchange in 
London.17 
 
Like many other smaller British oil companies prior to 1914, Bergheim actively 
worked towards establishing closer co-operation between the British government and 
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Nigeria Bitumen. His request for state financial assistance in 1906 was not out of the 
ordinary. Indeed Jones notes several requests from oil companies for financial assistance 
from the state, such as the request for a government loan of £10,000 made by the West 
Indian Petroleum Company in 1903. These requests increased greatly after the failure of 
many British oil investments in Maikop in Russia made money markets less enthusiastic 
about the funding of speculative oil ventures after 1910. In return for governmental 
financial assistance, many oil companies offered the Admiralty the right of pre-emption, 
which would have ensured a secure outlet for any oil that the companies might find. They 
were also not averse to offering the British government stakes in their companies 
because, as Jones points out, governmental involvement would ensure financial 
assistance, protection in foreign countries in the form of diplomatic support, and sought-
after Naval fuel oil contracts. The British government, however, was not only reluctant to 
grant requests for financial assistance, but was further unwilling to become directly 
involved in a British oil company, regardless of the attractiveness of the offer. This state 
of affairs would only change in 1914 when the government, at the urging of the 
Admiralty, became a majority stakeholder in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (later 
renamed the British Petroleum Company) with 51 per cent of the shares.18 
 
In 1906 Bergheim entered into lengthy discussions with the Admiralty and the 
Colonial Office in an attempt to secure governmental financial assistance to explore for 
oil in Southern Nigeria. The British government only approved the loan of £25,000 
towards the end of 1907 and the first instalment was paid in February 1908.19 Bergheim’s 
success in securing the loan was in no small part due to his own persistent nature and the 
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fact that his request was enthusiastically supported by the Governor of Southern Nigeria, 
Sir Walter Egerton. According to Carland, Egerton held strong views on the role of the 
government in economic development and believed Southern Nigeria would only develop 
economically with financial assistance from the colonial government. To this end he 
embarked on development projects that greatly improved the infrastructure, encouraged 
the exploitation of known mineral resources, and sought expansion of existing 
agricultural exports and the development of new agricultural exports.20 It was within this 
context that he supported the granting of the loan to Nigeria Bitumen, though it is clear 
from the consulted sources that oil did not figure in his development planning for the 
colony.21 Oil of commercial quantity and quality had to be discovered first before the 
colonial government would start to factor this sector into their development plans for 
Nigeria. 
 
Nigeria Bitumen’s operations commenced in 1906 under the guidance of their 
manager Frank Drader (he was a Canadian of German descent with practical oil 
experience in Canada and Galicia, from where most of the crew also came). Its operations 
had an enormous impact on the local environment in Lekki Lagoon as vast tracts of land 
were cleared to make room for houses, a tram way and drilling sites, not to mention the 
pollution that resulted from oil discoveries and spillages. This site also served as the 
company’s headquarters in Nigeria and it had limited involvement in the colony beyond 
the utilisation of local labour.22 It originally intended to search for both bitumen and 
crude oil, but the search for oil became their main focus from 1908 onwards. Between 
1908 and 1912 Nigeria Bitumen drilled about 15 wells in their Lekki Lagoon concession 
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under the supervision of a Mr Van Sickle. Oil was struck in November 1908 at well no. 5, 
which was drilled with their new oil rig purchased with their government loan.23 As 
Drader explained in a letter to his wife on 24 September 1909, however, well no. 5 did 
not turn into the anticipated active oil field, and had a significant environmental impact: 
We got No 5 Well on oil again and it started to flow at the rate of about 2000 bbls per day 
but after it had flowed a few hours at this rate it came on hot water and we are only getting about 
50 bbls of oil from it now. I expect there was great excitement in London when they got the news 
that Suiogu was flowing so much oil. The lagoon is at present all covered with oil.... and there was 
so much oil at our wharf here that the Doctor got all covered last night when he went in swimming, 
which he does every evening...24 
 
The company’s most successful discovery was from well no. 12 which yielded oil 
of good quality, without gas,25 and which was described by the foremost petroleum 
expert in Britain, Sir Boverton Redwood as ‘by far the most important event which has 
occurred during the company’s operations’.26 Redwood’s favourable report helped 
increase the value of Nigeria Bitumen shares in 1911, but the company ultimately proved 
unable to exploit its find profitably. They struggled in particular with water intrusion and 
did not possess the necessary equipment to separate out the water that flowed 
continuously into some of its most promising wells. In addition, they found the Nigerian 
environment challenging with their Lekki Lagoon concession often inundated with water 
during the rainy season, they were also limited in their choice of drilling sites by the 
swampy nature of the terrain and the lack of infrastructure, and found the local 
communities unwilling to share information on the location of the most promising 
bitumen outcrops. 27 
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 Financial difficulties impeded the expansion of exploratory work, and by July 
1912 Nigeria Bitumen had only enough capital to continue its operations for another six 
months. Bergheim consequently appealed to the Colonial Office for another loan, but 
died shortly thereafter, in December 1912, in an automobile accident. Despite the support 
of the Admiralty the loan was not approved mainly because of three factors: firstly, 
Bergheim’s death meant that the crucial link between Nigeria Bitumen and the Colonial 
Office was removed and the Company simply had no other proponent of Bergheim’s 
calibre and persistence. Secondly, in the departure of Governor Egerton (replaced in 1912 
by Sir Frederick Lugard), Nigeria Bitumen lost another of its most enthusiastic 
supporters, and the only person who could convince the rather tight-fisted officials in the 
Colonial Office to approve the loan. Egerton had been ‘rewarded’ by the Colonial Office 
for his development work in Southern Nigeria by being demoted to the post of Governor 
of British Guiana.28 Thirdly, as mentioned above, the failure of most British oil 
investments in Russia made not only the money markets, but also the British government 
very reluctant to invest in speculative oil ventures after 1910. Due to a lack of capital 
Nigeria Bitumen ceased all operations in Nigeria by the end of 1913 and the company 
was liquidated in 1914.29 It was its liquidation rather than the outbreak of World War 
One, as Njeze and Frynas argue,30 that led to the termination of the activities of Nigeria 
Bitumen in the colony. 
 
Nigeria Bitumen was not the only company to explore for oil in Nigeria before 
1914, although its competitors were even less successful and less is known of their 
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operations. Colonial Office correspondence with the Southern Nigeria government lists 
enquiries about oil exploration licences received from the British Colonial Petroleum 
Corporation (Limited), Captain Edward Algeron Barnett and Rosewarne (Limited).31 
Njeze discuss the case of Barnett in detail, calling it, rather dramatically, a ‘protracted 
and disgusting incident of oil concession and tussle’.32 Barnett was an oil speculator who, 
despite paying a deposit and rent on an oil concession covering about 100 m2 in Southern 
Nigeria in 1907, was never granted the concession by the colonial government. This 
minor detail did not stop Barnett from attempting to sell his concession in Britain at an 
inflated price, which in turn incurred the wrath of the Southern Nigeria government, the 
Colonial Office and Nigeria Bitumen. Barnett’s activities ensured that the colonial 
government included measures to discourage oil speculation in the colony in its 1907 
Mining Regulation (Oil) Ordinance.33 This affair did not adversely affect the relationship 
between Barnett and the Colonial Office, whose officials were of the opinion that future 
applications from Barnett would receive ‘very sympathetic consideration’.34 
 
In the end, only the British Colonial Petroleum Corporation proceeded in 
searching for oil in the colony. The company was incorporated in London in December 
1908 and emerged out of the Nigerian Investment Company, which had been granted an 
oil exploration licence over an area of 225 m2 in Southern Nigeria in January 1906. The 
Nigerian Investment Company started exploratory and development work in its 
concession in October 1906, under the supervision of Bernard A. Collins. In this process 
13 shallow boreholes, with an average depth of 100 ft., were sunk in order to prove 
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whether the oil line was satisfactory. In each case the drill passed through or finished in 
oil sand.35 
 
Collins’ positive findings led to the creation of the British Colonial Petroleum 
Corporation which was tasked with exploring for oil in the Nigerian Investment 
Company concession. Both the board of the new corporation and their financial 
arrangements clearly illustrated the close relations among the many small British oil 
companies, in particular those with West African interests. Its first chairman, until 
December 1908, was Bergman from Nigeria Bitumen, while George Wellington Statham, 
a director of the Nigeria Investment Company, was appointed a director. Statham along 
with the former chairman of the Nigeria Investment Company were also on the board of 
the Société Française de Pétrole, Limited (incorporated in London in February 1907 to 
explore in the Tano Lagoon region in the Ivory Coast), a company chaired by Bergheim 
of Nigeria Bitumen. The Nigerian Investment Company, in turn, held a considerable 
share in the Société Française de Pétrole, as it did in the Gold Coast Oil and Bitumen 
Corporation, Limited (floated in London in December 1908 to search for oil in the 
Apollonia district). According to its chairman, H.J. Brown, the Nigerian Investment 
Company had in 1907 a shareholding in every company that explored for oil and bitumen 
in West Africa. In many of these companies they cooperated, in one way or another, with 
the Nigeria Bitumen Corporation.36 The latter also became involved in the newly 
incorporated British Colonial Petroleum Corporation through a financial and operational 
agreement in which Nigeria Bitumen was contracted to act as agents and managers for 
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the new company for a period of two years. As compensation, Nigeria Bitumen received 
shares and 10 per cent of the net profits.37 
 
The Nigerian Investment Company provided British Colonial Petroleum with a 
cash capital of £35,000 to explore for oil in its concession situated in the Benin district 
close to the Benin River and the coast.  Under the direction of its oil engineer, D.P. 
Brown, the company explored unsuccessfully for oil for four years. In its last operating 
year in Nigeria, 1913, the company spend just over £5,052 before ceasing operations in 
the colony. By 1916 the company focused exclusively on its Romania concession in a 
joint venture with Shinx Petroleum Company (Limited). In 1924 the Company went into 
voluntary liquidation and was finally wound up in 1930.38 
 
Even though Nigeria Bitumen never managed to set up commercial oil operations 
in Nigeria, its chairman, Bergheim, made a lasting contribution to the colonial oil 
industry through his involvement in the development of oil legislation. From the start 
Bergheim maintained that the general mining legislation was not adequate to regulate the 
oil industry. Consequently he lobbied the Colonial Office and Southern Nigeria 
government for the development of specific oil regulations. Modelled mostly on the 
Trinidad oil mining law, the Southern Nigeria Mining Regulation (Oil) Ordinance of 
1907 was drafted by Frederick Butler and Charles Strachey, clerks in the Nigeria 
Department in the Colonial Office, and an unnamed governmental legal adviser.39 
 
 14
In line with general British oil policy, which determined in 1904 that oil 
exploration concessions in the British Empire should preferably only be granted to 
companies registered in Britain or its colonies,40 the 1907 Ordinance made the search for 
oil in Nigeria a British monopoly. Section 15 of the Ordinance further specified that all 
members of the directorate of these companies be British subjects.41 This principle was 
retained in the 1914 Mineral Oils Ordinance, which applied to all areas in the newly 
amalgamated Nigeria, and its 1925, 1950 and 1958 amendments. These versions, 
however, allowed for the inclusion of non-British directors provided that the director, the 
chairperson and the majority of other directors were British subjects.42 Section 7(2) of the 
1907 Ordinance also limited the size of concessions to 500 m2, which was considerably 
larger than the 5 m2 that was considered early in the drafting process. While the colonial 
government strictly enforced this limit, the whole Section 7 was omitted from the 1914 
Ordinance because the colonial government felt that the discovery of oil by Nigerian 
Bitumen had rendered this clause a ‘dead letter’. In future the colonial government would 
only enforce Rule 1 of Schedule II of the 1907 Ordinance, which stipulated that 
applicants must provide full details on the size, location and boundaries of the 
concessionary areas in their applications.43 
 
The 1907 Ordinance was drafted without consultation with the Lagosian elite and 
Native Authorities. The unofficial African members of the Legislative Council found 
section 5 of the new ordinance unacceptable because it gave the governor the right to 
enter into agreements with Native Authorities over the purchase of both surface and sub-
surface mineral rights on their lands without the payment of royalties on oil. One of the 
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unofficial members of the Legislative Council, C.S. Sapara Williams, proposed an 
amendment to section 5 during the discussion of the ordinance in the Council, suggesting 
the section should be expanded to guarantee Native Authorities ‘a fare and reasonable 
proportion of the royalties received from the minerals oils obtained’ from their land.44 
This proposed amendment was supported by all the unofficial African members of the 
Council, but was rejected by the official members and the Governor, who held the 
majority of votes. The Lagos Standard commented on this ordinance and the rejection of 
the amendment that 
If the ordinance become law, or rather when [it] does become law, it will give to the 
Government and the European prospector the kernel of the oil mining business, leaving to the 
Native the shell in other words giving him the doubtful privilege of working to enrich the white 
man.45 
 
By 1914 no commercial corporation was actively searching for oil in the colony. 
Even the Mineral Survey of Southern Nigeria, which was established in 1903 to explore 
for and collect minerals in the region with the aim of finding economically viable 
resources, showed limited interest in the oil possibilities of the colony. During the course 
of their work in 1913 the Mineral Survey did find traces of oil at Abagama, 13 miles east 
of Onitsha, in the Awka district. The Survey was at that time, however, focused on 
developing the black bituminous coal deposits that were discovered in 1909 along the 
Enugu-Udi escarpment.46 It is clear from their reports that the Mineral Survey opted at an 
early stage to leave oil exploration to private oil companies, preferring instead to 
frequently visit and inspect the exploration sites of the various companies that operated in 
Nigeria between 1903 and 1914, and to co-operate closely with these companies through 
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the sharing of scientific and geological information and specimens.47 This trend would 
continue after the Geological Survey of Nigeria was established in 1919, and none of its 
annual reports, bulletins or occasional papers makes any reference to the Geological 
Survey being actively involved in any oil exploration activities throughout the colonial 
era. It therefore seems that the traces of oil discovered by the Mineral Survey in 1914 and 
the Geological Survey in 1928 were incidental to the real focus of their investigations, 
and were consequently not acted upon. Real oil exploration in colonial Nigeria was left to 
be conducted by oil companies.48 
 
Revival of interest, 1918-1923 
 
The central role played by refined crude oil products in World War One ensured 
the massive expansion of the global oil industry after the war as oil companies sought to 
increase the global supply of oil to meet shortfalls experienced immediately after the war, 
and to prepare for the projected explosion in the demand for crude oil products in the 
years ahead. The search for oil in the British Empire was prioritised by the British 
government in their quest to lessen the country’s dependence on American oil which 
supplied around 80 per cent of Britain’s total crude oil needs by the end World War One. 
At that stage, imperial oil production only made up 2.5 per cent of global production, and 
this decreased to 1.6 per cent by 1927, of which only an estimated one-tenth reached the 
British home market. Despite Britain’s anxiety over the dependence on foreign oil 
supplies, the government did very little to promote the actual exploration for oil in the 
Empire and offered no special subsidies or inducements to oil companies if they 
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undertook oil explorations in the colonies. In addition, the British government continued 
to exclude non-British oil companies from Empire oil, despite regular demands made by 
the American government that the British open-up their colonies to oil companies that 
were wholly owned and controlled by American interests. Against this background, the 
key problem for the British government was to convince British oil concerns to take up 
oil exploration in the Empire.49 
 
Only two companies were interested in the oil possibilities of Nigeria in the post-
1918 period, namely the D’Arcy Exploration Corporation and the Whitehall Petroleum 
Corporation. For both, their Nigerian operations formed part of deliberate attempts to 
expand their operations to other parts of the world and it was undertaken more in the 
hope than the belief that commercially exploitable oil resources would be found in the 
colony. Their operations would not last long and by 1923 both companies gave up on 
their hopes of finding oil in Nigeria, thereby ending the very short second phase in the 
search for oil in the colony, and consequently strengthening the view that the challenging 
Nigerian environment compromised the search for oil resources, if indeed they existed. 
 
The D’Arcy Exploration Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company, became interested in Nigeria in 1918 as part of a wider strategy by 
the company to extend their interests beyond Persia. According to Ferrier, the chairman 
of Anglo-Persian, Sir Walter Greenway, was determined to develop his company in such 
a way that it could compete with Royal Dutch/Shell and Standard Oil. The massive 
expansion of the company’s concessionary interests formed an integral part of 
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Greenway’s plans and these interests took the company to areas such as Kuwait, 
Colombia, Venezuela, Papua, New Brunswick in Canada, the Gold Coast, Nigeria, 
Borneo and Timor. In most of these regions Anglo-Persian relinquished its concessions in 
the 1920s, mainly because of unsatisfactory geological evidence, but also because of 
unacceptable terms and conditions imposed by some host governments. After John 
Cadman (Greenway’s successor as chairman in 1927) formed the Fields, Refinery and 
Geological Department in 1922, the company became more discerning in choosing its 
concessions around the globe and now had the necessary geological expertise to make 
more informed decisions.50 
 
It is in this context that Greenway approached the Crown Agents and the Nigerian 
colonial government on behalf of the D’Arcy Exploration Company in January 1918 with 
the aim of obtaining an oil exploration licence.51 Showing good business sense, Fred G. 
Watson from D’Arcy pointed out in his correspondence with the Crown Agents that the 
company would have no objections to providing oil that conformed to the latest 
Admiralty specifications. D’Arcy’s exploration licence was granted after protracted 
negotiations on 28 February 1921 and covered the area extending from the border with 
Dahomey (Bénin) in the west to the Niger River, at the Akassa Mouth, in the east, 
extending 50 miles inland from the sea.52 D’Arcy’s choice of concession area was 
directly influenced by Nigeria Bitumen’s oil discoveries in previous years and it obtained 
detailed information on its concession from Mr Van Sickle, who had headed Nigeria 
Bitumen’s drilling operations.53 Limited documentary evidence was found of D’Arcy oil 
exploration activities in the sources consulted. Two men from D’Arcy visited the region 
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in March 1922 to explore for oil, while the company also contacted Dr J.D. Falconer, the 
Director of the Geological Survey, in 1923 to request that he undertake geological 
investigations on its behalf. This request came too late in the dry season to allow for 
geological work during 1923.54 A company publication claimed in 1970 that ‘the team 
embarked upon extensive reconnaissance work and geological survey, which by oil 
industry standards, was said to be tough and arduous’.55 This claim is rather excessive 
since D’Arcy spent only £1,290 exploring for oil in its Nigerian concession. In Africa 
alone the company spent more money on oil explorations in Nyasaland (£33,334), 
Somaliland (£6,935), the Sudan (£2,265), South West Africa (£2,056) and Uganda 
(£1,761) between 1918 and 1928.56 Beyond 1923 no reference is made to D’Arcy and it 
is therefore assumed that it allowed its exploration licence to lapse when it came up for 
renewal in February 1924. Whether this action was influenced by the views of the well-
known British geologist, E.H. Cunningham Craig’s advisors opinion in November 1922 
is open to debate. Craig declared to the company’s Chief Geologist that ‘the report [on 
Southern Nigeria] adds nothing to what I knew in 1906. It is not worth spending another 
cent on the Concession’.57 
 
By that time the Whitehall Petroleum Corporation had also given up all hope of 
finding oil of commercial quantities in Nigeria. Whitehall formed part of Lord Cowdray’s 
companies (S. Pearson and Son) that also included the successful Mexican oil company 
El Aguila, and the United States incorporated Amerada Petroleum Corporation. El Aguila 
was sold to Royal Dutch/Shell in 1919, generating profits that enabled Whitehall to 
widen the geographical scope of its exploration activities to include India, Argentina, 
 20
Bolivia and Nigeria, and to expand its exploratory work in Algeria and Trinidad.58 
Whitehall became interested in Nigeria in 1920 and approached the Crown Agents about 
an oil exploration licence on 8 June. An exploration concession was granted on 13 June 
1921 and covered the territory from the boundary of British Cameroons in the east, to the 
Niger River at the Akassa Mouth in the west, stretching from the shoreline to the seventh 
degree of the northern latitude. Whitehall’s geological party, headed by L.D. Burling, 
spent much of 1921 investigating the concession. After submitting their report, 
Whitehall’s board decided to relinquish all their rights under the concession in March 
1922 because the conditions did not justify test drilling.59 
 
Shell/D’Arcy in colonial Nigeria, 1936-1958 
 
The D’Arcy Exploration Company revived their interest in Nigeria in the 1930s, 
which started the third and final phase of oil exploration in colonial Nigeria. This interest 
ran against a wider trend observed by Bamberg who claims that the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company was less interested in pursuing concessionary interests outside the Middle East 
and South America in the 1930s than it was in the 1920s. In his view this was mainly due 
to the size of the Iranian oil deposits and the fact that there was excess productive 
capacity on a global level during the decade.60 D’Arcy’s renewed interest was sparked by 
a promising report written by one of their geologists, B.K.N. Wyllie in 1933, which once 
again focused attention on the widespread occurrence of oil and bitumen seepages along 
the Nigerian coastline. This and subsequent geological reports persuaded D’Arcy to 
return to Nigeria even though the company’s geologists had to admit that most oil 
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indications along the West Coast consisted of so-called dead oil (i.e. bituminous sands, 
viscous oil and pitch lakes).61 
 
This time D’Arcy did not go into Nigeria alone, but did so in partnership with 
Royal Dutch/Shell (hereafter Shell). It is unclear why D’Arcy opted for a joint venture 
with Shell. By the mid-1930s Shell and Anglo-Iranian were already cooperating in 
marketing petroleum products in the Middle East and Africa through their co-owned 
Consolidated Petroleum Company (created in 1928). They also merged their British 
marketing subsidiaries in the early 1930s, and agreed on a joint venture in exploring for 
oil in New Zealand in 1938.62 In the absence of documentary evidence a plausible 
explanation for D’Arcy and Shell’s decision to cooperate in Nigeria in the 1930s might 
be found in the British control clause of the colony’s Mineral Oils Ordinance which 
barred Dutch-controlled Shell from exploring for oil in the colony.63 The plausibility of 
this suggestion is strengthened by correspondence between D’Arcy and the Colonial 
Office in which the latter advised D’Arcy to delay applying for an oil exploration licence 
until 1938. According to the Colonial Office the government was in the process of 
changing the model mining licences and leases to reflect announcements made in 
Parliament in June 1936, that foreigners and foreign controlled companies would be 
allowed to operate in the colonial empire from 1938 onwards. It was pointed out that, 
should D’Arcy choose to apply before these new regulations were in place, then the 
company would have to conform to the British control clause in existing mineral oil 
regulations.64 In the end, however, this clause was not removed from the Nigerian 
Mineral Oil Ordinance, which in turn created problems for the joint venture in the 1948 
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when the directorate of the Shell Overseas Exploration Company had a majority Dutch 
membership. Consequently the company was forced to change the composition of its 
directorate to satisfy the British control clause in the Nigerian legislation.65 
 
On 10 August 1936 a joint application was submitted to the Colonial Office in the 
names of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company (a 
wholly owned subsidiary of the Royal Dutch/Shell group of companies) for exclusive 
permission to explore for oil over the whole of Nigeria, Kenya and Tanganyika. In 
Nigeria a complication arose in the form of Major Seaborne Marks who resubmitted an 
oil exploration application in May 1936. Marks had applied for an oil exploration licence 
in 1931 for an area covering about 30,000 m2 in Southern Nigeria. After the colonial 
government informed him of the conditions under which they were prepared to grant the 
concession, he opted not to pursue the application. His 1936 application covered much of 
the same territory as his original application, and was turned down by the Colonial Office 
in favour of that from Anglo-Saxon/D’Arcy which the Colonial Office believed would 
take its oil exploration activities more seriously and who were more likely to succeed.66 
In December 1936 the Colonial Office informed Anglo-Saxon/D’Arcy of their decision 
to grant the joint venture an exclusive exploration licence covering the whole mainland 
Nigeria. This licence was issued in 1937, and in December 1937 the name Anglo-Saxon 
Petroleum Company was replaced by that of the Shell Overseas Exploration Company 
Limited on the official licence.67 
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Shell/D’Arcy started geological surveying in early 1937 under the direction of a 
Dr Irving, the head of their geological party, and a Dr Carr, a geophysicist. From their 
headquarters in Enugu, geological and geophysical surveys were carried out in Southern 
Nigeria around Enugu, Port Harcourt, the Nsukka-Okigwi-Afikpo escarpment, along the 
Niger and Cross rivers, and over Benin City and Forcados. Geological core drillings were 
also undertaken, starting near Uge Emme in June 1938.68 By the end of 1939, 
Shell/D’Arcy had spent about £70,000 exploring for oil in Nigeria. Their exploration 
activities in Kenya and Tanganyika, on the other hand, had proven unsuccessful and the 
joint venture suspended work in these colonies to focus exclusively on Nigeria. The 
outbreak of the Second World War complicated matters. At the urging of the Petroleum 
Department of the British Ministry of Fuel and Power, geological, geophysical and 
topographical survey work was continued in 1940, costing the joint venture a total of 
£72,313.69 By 1941, however, it no longer seemed feasible to continue with oil 
exploration in Nigeria, and in February 1941 the Colonial Office informed the companies 
that the Governor of Nigeria had agreed to the suspension of operations.70 
 
Shell/D’Arcy resumed its Nigerian operations only in 1946 owing to the difficulty 
of obtaining suitable staff and equipment in the immediate aftermath of the war. Their 
initial exploratory work had showed that the most favourable oil-yielding structures lay in 
Eastern Nigeria, where they started work in 1946 in the Owerri, Okigwi and Umuahia 
regions. Two large camps were developed on Crown Land at Owerri and Okigwi after the 
war, which were connected with exploration sites by helicopters. The Owerri camp, in 
particular, expanded very quickly and developed into the operational headquarters of 
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Shell/D’Arcy and remained so until the headquarters were moved to Port Harcourt in 
1961.71 
 
Oil exploration in the post World War Two era took place within the context of 
Britain’s post-war recovery and attempts to strengthen the generally weak sterling against 
the American dollar, and the commencement of development projects in the British 
colonies after the passing of the 1945 Colonial Development and Welfare Act. Oil 
exports from Nigeria did not feature in the British government’s plans to increase exports 
from the colonies in order to earn much-needed dollars, nor did it feature in the 1946 
Nigerian Ten-Year Plan for Development and its 1951 revisions. This was because oil of 
commercial quality and quality had not yet been discovered in Nigeria. Consequently, 
like previous administrations, the post-war Nigerian colonial government could not make 
any definite development plans within the oil sector nor plan any expenditure based on 
expected oil revenues.72 
 
While the emerging oil industry did not make it onto the colonial government’s 
official development agenda, Shell/D’Arcy did receive greater support from the Nigerian 
government than any oil company had in the pre-1945 period. This support found 
expression in the charging of very low fees for temporary occupation licences such as the 
initial £1 per annum fee charged for the leasing of 175,000 square yards on Crown Land 
in Okigwi in 1948 (which increased to £5 per acre in 1949) and in making available more 
land in Owerri for the company as its operations expanded.73 More importantly, the 
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government openly supported the joint venture and its exploration activities in the face of 
strong local opposition in some districts at the end of the 1940s. 
 
The open support for Shell/D’Arcy by the colonial government should not only be 
viewed within the narrow confines of governmental support for economic development, 
but also within the context of Nigerian decolonization and the conflict between the 
Nigerian administration and the well-organised nationalist movement in Eastern Nigeria 
led by Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe and the National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons 
(NCNC). As was the case in many African colonies, World War Two greatly influenced 
the Nigerian nationalist movement, and after the war Azikiwe and the NCNC became 
vocal opponents of most of the initiatives implemented by the unpopular governor, Sir 
Arthur Richards. The passing of the so-called ‘Obnoxious Ordinances’ in 1945 was no 
exception and Azikiwe and the NCNC rallied popular support in much of Southern 
Nigeria in opposition to these ordinances.74 One of these was the Mineral Ordinance 
which restated the claim that mineral rights were vested in the Crown.75 According to 
Coleman the nationalist movement interpreted this to mean the confiscation of Nigeria’s 
minerals by the British government (along with their land through two other ‘obnoxious 
ordinances’). These ordinances translated into renewed control by the British government 
at a time when nationalist leaders expected that controls would be relaxed, and 
consequently they were passionately opposed by the people in Southern Nigeria under the 
guidance of Azikiwe and the NCNC.76 
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The mobilization of public support by Azikiwe, along with his willingness to 
publicize and actively support all grievances of local communities against the colonial 
government and European interests in his newspapers, brought local opposition to 
Shell/D’Arcy’s exploration activities into the open.77 The secretive nature of the joint 
venture’s activities, and its unwillingness to inform local communities of what exactly it 
was doing in their territories, had already led to questions being asked in the Legislative 
Council in March 1940 by land owners in the Okigwi and Afikpo areas regarding the 
nature of their operations, their claims to land, and the size of their concession.78 
Shell/D’Arcy’s lack of communication with local communities stemmed mainly from the 
legislative context in which they operated in Nigeria: the Mineral Oils Ordinance did not 
require the joint venture to obtain permission from any land owners to conduct 
exploratory work, but it did guarantee the oil exploration parties protection from any 
person who might interfere with their work, who was liable on conviction to be fined or 
imprisoned. The only protection the ordinance provided for local communities was the 
offer of compensation (payable to local communities) for the destruction of economic 
trees and crops by oil exploration parties at rates set by the District Officer.79 
 
As mentioned earlier, Shell/D’Arcy’s exploration work after 1946 focused 
initially on the Owerri, Okigwi and Umuahia regions which were already densely 
populated and where Azikiwe and the NCNC enjoyed strong support by that time. 
Consequently, when the Ikeduru people rose up in opposition to the joint venture’s 
exploration party headed by a Mr H.S. Marchant in late 1948, Azikiwe’s paper the West 
African Pilot was quick to publicize this opposition and to lend strong support to the 
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Ikeduru people in a number of editorials. The Ikeduru people firmly rejected 
governmental claims to the rights over all minerals on their land, and refused to grant 
permission to the government or any company to mine these minerals. They therefore 
requested the colonial government to order both the Owerri District Officer and 
Shell/D’Arcy ‘to stop meddling with their inalienable mineral rights’.80 Opposition also 
spread to other parts of the region: in February 1949 the Shell/D’Arcy exploration party 
clashed with the local community in Orodo which led to the summoning of the Umuahia 
police by the Owerri District Officer to provide protection for it. This act was strongly 
condemned by the West African Pilot which wrote that the District Officer should have 
sided with the people and not the joint venture. 81 Opposition to Shell/D’Arcy was not 
confined to communities in which the joint venture was engaged in exploration work. 
The Mbama Clan in the Okigwi district, for example, drew up a petition against the joint 
venture in August 1949, which stated that they did not want the joint venture to enter 
their land, nor explore it or drill for oil. This petition predated activities by Shell/D’Arcy 
in the Mbama Clan territory.82 
 
Azikiwe not only publicized local opposition to Shell/D’Arcy in his newspapers, 
but further raised the issue at the Legislative Council in April 1949 when he asked the 
governor to explain the joint venture’s activities and position in the Ikeduru area in the 
Owerri district.83 The joint venture and the colonial government initially responded to 
this opposition in two ways: firstly, they were quick to attribute much of the agitation to 
the nationalist movement in Eastern Nigeria and to Azikiwe in particular. Azikiwe was 
accused of ‘always [being] ready to take up the cudgels in his newspaper on behalf of any 
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cause, regardless of its merits, out of which he thinks political capital can be made’.84 In 
this way local protests became tainted by their association with Azikiwe in the eyes of the 
colonial authorities and Shell/D’Arcy. Secondly, the colonial government did not hesitate 
to use force or the threat thereof against communities, and willingly sent police to protect 
the exploration parties in the Ikeduru and Orodo areas. 
 
From the consulted sources it is clear that the colonial government and 
Shell/D’Arcy decided to explore less confrontational methods in its handling of local 
opposition to oil exploration in the second half of 1949. In a widely published public 
statement issued on 4 August 1949 the colonial government expressed its concerns 
regarding what it termed the ‘misunderstanding over the activities of the Shell Company’ 
and clearly stated the terms under which the joint venture operated. Land owners were 
assured that the joint venture had no right to acquire any land, and that compensation 
would be paid for all damages. The government also made it clear that they would 
continue its support for Shell/D’Arcy given the enormous benefits to the future of Nigeria 
if the joint venture were to discover oil of commercial quantity and quality.85 
Shell/D’Arcy also experimented with this less confrontational approach when they 
informed the residents of Onitsha on 22 October 1949 of their intention to start 
exploration work in the area one week later. In a remarkable statement the joint venture 
provided full details of exactly what their work would entail (e.g. the clearing of a 
straight strip of land, six feet wide and about two miles long) and the objectives of the 
work. The statement also assured the land owners that the joint venture would not be 
acquiring any land, and that the owners should make all claims for damages to the 
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District Officer.86 These actions by the colonial government and Shell/D’Arcy seemingly 
satisfied nationalist leaders and local communities, since after October 1949 there is no 
mention in the consulted sources of any local opposition to the oil exploration in general 
and Shell/D’Arcy in particular in the period that falls within the scope of this article.87 
 
Support from nationalist leaders for anti-Shell/D’Arcy protests also greatly 
diminished in the second half of 1949 as these leaders finally came to realise the potential 
of oil in securing financial viability for a future independent Nigeria. This change in 
position was clearly expressed by the stance of the Executive Council in the disagreement 
between the governor, Sir John Macpherson, and Shell/D’Arcy that dominated relations 
between August and November 1949. When the joint venture applied for a prospecting 
licence in August 1949 to embark on more extensive exploratory work, Macpherson saw 
this as the perfect opportunity to negotiate with the joint venture on a number of issues he 
considered crucial to the future development of Nigeria and to obtain popular support for 
oil developments. In a number of meetings in Lagos and London between representatives 
from Shell/D’Arcy, the Colonial Office, the Ministry of Fuel and Power, and the Nigerian 
colonial government, Macpherson repeatedly made four demands, namely  
(1) The formation of a new local Company for the special purpose of developing Nigeria’s  
oil resources. 
(2) Some system whereby the Nigerian Government would share in the profits earned by  
the Company. 
(3) Government to have the right to appoint one director to the Board of the Company. 
(4) The Nigerian public to have the opportunity of subscribing a certain proportion of the share 
capital of the Company.88 
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Macpherson’s proposals were very progressive for the time and were resisted by 
the joint venture on many grounds, but most importantly because it would ‘constitute an 
undesirable precedent’ which would complicate the negotiations between oil companies 
and governments in other parts of the world.89 Protracted negotiations could not convince 
Shell/D’Arcy to change its position, and it insisted that there was no real justification to 
depart from the Colonial Model Oil Mining Regulations on which the Nigerian Mineral 
Oils Ordinance was based.90 Much to the annoyance and disappointment of the governor, 
the other members of the Executive Council agreed with Shell/D’Arcy and voted on 19 
November 1949 to retain the existing legislative framework for the joint venture’s 
prospecting work, which made allowance only for the then standard payment of rents, 
royalties and taxes once oil exploitation and exportation commenced. The Council based 
their decision on the fact that it was ‘of vital interest to Nigeria that the search for oil 
continued’ and that any ‘discovery should be exploited without delay’.91 This decision by 
the Executive Council elevated oil permanently to the level of a national interest and as 
the involvement of nationalist leaders in the governing of Nigeria grew in the course of 
the 1950s, local interests became even more subordinate when they clashed with national 
interests. 
 
In due course the joint venture did agree to form a locally incorporated company, 
which was called the Shell/D’Arcy Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, 
Limited. The company was registered on 10 September 1951 in Lagos.92 Shortly 
thereafter Shell/D’Arcy also adopted a limited policy of Nigerianisation. This policy was 
first implemented by the colonial government in the civil service in 1948 to prepare the 
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country for independence in the long term. Though extremely important to and popular 
with nationalist leaders, the tempo of Nigerianisation was too slow for most Nigerians 
and this issue became a regular point of conflict between the colonial government and the 
nationalist leaders. Though European enterprises were encouraged to adopt 
Nigerianisation policies, there was no official governmental policy to guide this process 
in the private sector. Consequently the Nigerianisation of European companies tended to 
proceed at a snail’s pace. Shell/D’Arcy was no exception and by 1954 the company listed 
only three Nigerians as occupying senior level positions out of a total workforce of 2,088. 
The slow tempo of the company’s Nigerianisation seem to have stemmed from a 
deliberate decision made by it to train only a few senior grade Nigerians for integration 
with their senior grade European staff. Very little is known of this process in 
Shell/D’Arcy since the consulted sources make almost no reference to it. The only other 
occasion when this issue came up was in March 1958 when the West African Pilot 
published a front page article on the promotion of five more Nigerians to senior positions 
in the joint venture.93 
  
Shell/D’Arcy’s concessionary area expanded directly after the war when their 
application to explore for oil in Nigeria’s territorial waters was approved in 1949.94 From 
1952 onwards, however, their concessionary territory was gradually reduced. In January 
1952 the joint venture reduced their oil exploration licence to an area in Southern Nigeria 
covering 56,000 m2 and stretching from the eastern border with Dahomey into the British 
Cameroons. This concession was reduced to 13,800 m2 on 19 January 1954.95 The 
reduction of Shell/D’Arcy’s concession territory resulted from their extensive exploratory 
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work that enabled them to relinquish control over areas that they were confident held 
limited or no oil possibilities. Between 1951 and 1957 the company gradually applied for 
twenty oil prospecting licences, covering about 40,000 m2, that enabled them to 
commence with more detailed geological and geophysical investigations, to drill and to 
start with test production. Their oil prospecting concessions were situated, inter alia, in 
the Orlu, Okigwi, Owerri and Bende Divisions of the Owerri Province, the Akwa, Awgu, 
Onitsha and Nkussa Divisions of the Onitsha Province, the Igala Division of the Kabba 
Province, Akata in the Calabar Province, and the Ashan and Asaba Divisions of the 
Benin Province.96 It conducted extensive gravity surveys in their concession between 
April 1948 and May 1953, and aerial photographic surveys between 1951 and 1954.97  
 
In 1951 the joint venture drilled its first deep exploration well at Ihuo, near 
Owerri, which turned out to be a dry well. Between 1951-1956 it drilled eighteen 
exploration, appraisal and development wells. Oil and gas were discovered at Akata in 
the Calabar Province in 1953, but the oil resources were very limited at this source.98 In 
January 1956 oil of commercial quantity and quality was finally discovered by 
Shell/D’Arcy at Oloibiri, situated 72 km west of Port Harcourt (at a depth of 12,008 ft). 
This was followed by the discovery of oil at Afam shortly thereafter (40 km east of Port 
Harcourt). By 1958 Shell/D’Arcy had discovered oil in 12 areas, of which Oloibiri, Afam 
and Bomu were the most promising. After increasing the Oilibiri-1 well depth to 131,000 
ft in 1957, the Oilibiri field was put into production. By then the company had begun 
with the development of the necessary infrastructure to transport the crude oil from its 
source to the company’s terminal in Port Harcourt. To this end, 6" and 10" diameter 
 33
welded steel oil pipelines were laid from the Umualogu Village (Ahoada Division), 
Egbema Village (Degema Division) and Obeakpu Village (Aba Division) to Port 
Harcourt.99 Oil production started at Oloibiri in early 1958 at 3,000 barrels per day, while 
the Afam field was also put into production in the same year. The first shipment of 
Nigerian crude oil exports (8,500 tons of crude oil) arrived at Rotterdam on 8 March 
1958. Bringing that first shipment to Rotterdam represented an investment of £27 million 
between 1936 and 1958 for Shell/D’Arcy.100 
 
The first shipment of Nigerian crude oil ushered in a new era in the Nigerian oil 
industry, which would over time see this industry develop into the dominant sector of the 
Nigerian economy. The successes of Shell/D’Arcy also attracted the attention of other 
multinational oil companies. Even before the discovery of oil at Oloibiri the process of 
opening up the Nigerian oil industry to other competitors was well under way. This 
process started in 1955 when the first non-Shell/D’Arcy oil exploration licence was 
granted to the Mobil Exploration Company of Nigeria Limited (a locally incorporated 
subsidiary of the Socony-Mobil Oil Company). Mobil’s concession covered most of 
Northern Nigeria, and the company very soon discovered why Shell/D’Arcy had 
relinquished their concession in this territory. By 1957 Mobil had relinquished most of 
the Northern Nigeria concession, apart from three small areas, and had applied for an 
exploration licence covering about 4,000 m2 in the Western Region, stretching from the 
border with Dahomey along the coast to the east of Lagos.101 The discovery of 
commercially viable oil deposits in Nigeria also coincided with the 1956 Suez Crisis, 
which ensured multinational oil company interest in Nigeria because this country was 
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situated on what was perceived to be the ‘right side’ of the Suez Canal.102 The 
commencement of crude oil exports in 1958 ensured the interest of other multinational oil 
companies, such as Gulf Oil, Tennessee Gas Transmission, the Italian firm ENI, and the 
Société Anonyme Française des Récherches et d’Exploration de Pétroles (SAFRAP), 
who all obtained oil exploration concessions between 1960 and 1962.103 
 
Conclusion 
 
The history of oil exploration in Nigeria clearly illustrates the fact that the 
discovery of commercially viable oil resources was a long, drawn-out process. Much to 
the disappointment of early oil ventures the Nigerian environment proved to be their most 
challenging obstacle which required greater technology than the petroleum industry 
possessed at the time. Consequently the early exploration work was plagued by failure. 
Nigeria, like many other tropical zones, greatly benefitted from the professionalization of 
the petroleum industry from the 1920s onwards which would in future provide oil 
companies with the necessary trained scientists and equipment to conduct successful 
exploratory work in challenging environments. 
 
In addition to the challenging environment, the British government did very little 
to promote oil exploration in colonial Nigeria. Negotiations for oil concessions were 
often protracted and no special incentives were offered to oil companies to retain their 
interest in Nigeria when initial investments were exhausted. As a consequence, the 
exploration for oil in colonial Nigeria became the domain of the large, integrated oil 
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companies, represented by Royal Dutch/Shell and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, who 
had the financial resources to fund the expensive search for oil in the colony and the 
technological expertise and equipment to achieve success over the long term. Even after 
the industry started to open-up to other competitors from 1955 onwards, it was only large 
oil companies who became involved in Nigerian oil. This dominance did not diminish 
after the Nigerian government obtained a majority share in all the oil companies active in 
the country in the 1970s, and this state of affairs ensured that Nigerian investors had 
limited opportunities to directly participate in their country’s largest industry up till the 
1990s when the government deliberately opened the industry up to smaller Nigerian oil 
companies. In part, this process of foreign domination and lack of local participation 
ensured that the oil industry retained its enclave character within the Nigerian economy 
during the independent era. It also ensured the alienation of local oil producing 
communities from this important resource, who were given limited opportunities to 
participate in the industry beyond their main role as semi-skilled and unskilled labour. 
 
This process of alienation was further enhanced by active government support for 
the oil industry in their often conflicting relations with local communities. This trend was 
firmly established in the 1940s when the colonial government gave their full support to 
Shell/D’Arcy in their dealings with local communities, and was further enhanced by the 
1949 decision by the Executive Council to allow the company to continue work along 
lines dictated by the company because oil was of national interest to Nigeria. Oil would 
remain a national interest in the country, to the detriment of local problems and concerns, 
until local oil producing communities forced the oil industry, the Nigerian government 
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and the world in the 1990s to take note of their grievances against oil production in their 
local environments. 
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